The design of national pension systems can have substantial influence upon the way in which financial sectors evolve. While economies of scale may appear to preclude certain design options involving a nascent industry comprising small private sector pension funds, collaboration provides scope for offsetting such concerns. The growth of the Australian superannuation sector, involving the creation and development of "nonprofit", representative trustee, industry funds provides a useful case study in this regard. The paper examines collaboration by Australian industry funds in the context of the sector's growth and development and considers the longer run sustainability of various elements of that collaboration.
Introduction
Increasing attention being given internationally to retirement savings policy has been accompanied by the evolution of a number of structural models for accumulation and management of those funds. These range from government run, mandatory, national contribution schemes through to voluntary (but tax preferred) individually managed schemes.
1 The wide range of options in between these extremes includes collective investment arrangements operated by government accredited private providers on either a for-profit or not-for-profit basis.
Developing an optimal structural model for retirement savings is an important public policy issue, still to be determined for many emerging economies, and is (or should be) a matter for ongoing review in economies with existing schemes. And because pension fund management is an industry involving economies of scale and specialist expertise, the growth and development phase throws up particular challenges for the viability of various structural models during that phase. For example, multiple private providers may appear less efficient than a single national provider in the development phase (due to small size, marketing costs, and limited expertise), but may prove more efficient in a mature, large scale, phase.
2 Consequently, there is potential value to be had in examining ways in which strategies, such as collaboration between private pension funds, can overcome some of the inefficiencies arising from small scale and lack of experience in the developmental phase of pension fund evolution. The Australian experience provides a useful case study in this regard, since it has been marked by successful collaboration strategies by a particular group of pension fund providers across a wide range of activities. That experience also prompts several questions for consideration, which this paper addresses.
They include: what types of activities present potential benefits from collaborative strategies; what institutional arrangements are likely to induce collaboration; can collaboration developed in the early phases of the sector's evolution survive as the industry matures and grows?
Section 1 of the paper considers in more detail the rationale and motivation for collaboration between private pension funds, based on an analysis of the broad characteristics of their activities and their organizational structures. Section 2 then examines specific areas in which potential benefits from collaboration may exist. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the development of Australian pension fund arrangements (generally referred to as superannuation) as a prelude to outlining, in section 4, the nature of collaboration which has evolved between the not-for-profit industry superannuation funds. The role of the trade union movement in campaigning for universal superannuation and the resulting development of increasingly influential and important not-for-profit financial institutions is an important feature of this development. Section 5 concludes by drawing out some implications for public policy.
Motives for Pension Fund Collaboration
Although pension fund arrangements vary across countries, the basic economic functions 3 performed by pension funds are common. First, they reduce transactions costs associated with the process of collecting, managing, and ultimately drawing down long term savings (and complying with regulations associated with any preferential tax treatment accorded to such savings). Second they pool funds from multiple contributors and are thus able to provide access to a broader and diversified investment universe.
Third, they provide access to specialized investment knowledge to manage risk and possibly generate higher risk-adjusted returns for savers. Fourth, the range of financial products offered by pension funds increases the opportunity set available to individuals, and may involve risk transformation and risk bearing by the fund managers (such as in the case of defined benefit products). Fifth, their investment activities transmit any specialist information they have generated into financial market prices and may also involve governance and monitoring activities.
The performance of these economic functions involves the use of real resources (such as labor and accounting and information systems), specialist knowledge and risk bearing by the managers of the pension fund, all of which involve economies of scale.
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Consequently, smaller organizations face a competitive disadvantage, unless they are able to find alternative ways of performing these economic functions. Here, two possibilities present themselves. The first is the outsourcing of particular functions to independent specialist providers who, because they provide these services to a number of entities are able to achieve economies of scale and develop expertise. If competition exists among such specialists, these benefits will be passed on to small pension funds using outsourcing in the form of lower fees for services provided than could be achieved internally. A second possibility is collaboration among small institutions by creation of a jointly owned specialist provider of particular services. 
Pension Fund Evolution in Australia
By 2008 The initial policy stimulus to the growth of industry funds occurred in 1986, when as part of the national wage bargaining process, it was agreed that employers would make superannuation contributions (equal to 3 per cent of wages) into approved funds on behalf of members under wage awards rather than a wage increase being awarded.
Subsequently, in 1992, the Federal Government introduced the "Superannuation Guarantee" legislation which required all employers to make superannuation contributions for employers, with the size of those contributions being increased over time to reach a level of 9 per cent of wages in 2003. Together with substantial tax incentives for superannuation savings, the introduction of compulsory superannuation has seen massive growth in the size of the pension fund sector in Australia. (although growth in self managed funds has been even greater). Also evident in Table 1 is the declining number of schemes as a result of mergers and closures involving transfers of members to other (industry) funds. Notably, the number of industry funds has also fallen as a result of mergers.
A further influence upon the sector's development has been the introduction of "Fund Choice" in 2005 providing individuals with the option to choose their preferred fund, and also to shift easily between funds. One consequence has been that industry funds are now potentially in competition for members. This has also encouraged a number of industry funds to broaden their trust deeds to become "public offer" funds allowing membership of individuals not employed in the relevant industry. In practice, most individuals commencing employment accept the "default option" fund chosen by the employer and few shift between funds.
These developments have significant social and economic implications. The funds management sector has burgeoned partly in response to the growth of superannuation savings, and the industry funds have become substantial and significant financial institutions. This is in distinct contrast to the decline of mutual, not-for-profit, financial institutions elsewhere in the Australian financial sector (such as insurance, building societies and credit unions). Whether a not-for-profit objective leads to better outcomes for member-customers is controversial 10 , but the industry funds have provided the trade union movement with the potential for increased influence in the financial sector. In practice this occurs more through alignment of trustees' values with those of the union movement than through a coordinated union agenda. Nevertheless, the sector's growth has promoted increased debate about the importance of governance in investee companies, investment in national infrastructure, and socially responsible investment (and the compatibility of these issues with maximizing investment returns for members).
Also important is the option which emerges for such large financial institutions to expand the range of financial services to their member-customers, and thus compete more directly with banks and other for-profit financial institutions. Economies of scope may exist in marketing other financial services to, and in managing a broader relationship with, members. In practice, this option is constrained by government legislation requiring superannuation funds to pass a "sole purpose" test that all the activities are for the purpose of providing retirement savings for members. Finding mechanisms for exploiting potential advantages in providing such services to members which are consistent with the sole purpose test has been one driver of innovative collaboration among the industry funds.
Collaboration between Industry Super Funds
As at the start of 2009, collaboration between Industry Funds in Australia took a number of forms, as shown in Table 2 . 
Organization

Conclusion
The pension fund industry in Australia provides an interesting case study of the evolution of collaboration between pension funds and the role this played in forming the current structure of the industry. There are a number of lessons to be drawn from the analysis.
First, it is likely that collaboration between pension funds has arisen because of a particular confluence of initial industry structure, powerful labor union movements and associated strong leaders, and particular events (such as the introduction of the mandatory superannuation guarantee) in Australia.
The current structure of the superannuation industry in Australia reflects the influence of a number of interacting historical factors. Collaboration by members of a nascent industry was instrumental in the evolution of the industry. The burden of regulatory and legislative changes 11 made it increasingly difficult for small funds to survive, many of which were too small to be cost-effective under a mandatory pension system (Bateman and Mitchell, 2004) . Partly in response to these regulatory pressures there was considerable consolidation as a result of merger activity resulting in a substantial reduction in the number of funds over 1996 to 2008 (documented in Table 1 ).
Concurrently, collaboration between funds in setting up ancillary services circumvented the legislated sole purpose test and gave smaller funds a greater chance of surviving because they were able to maintain low operating costs through the achieved economies of scale. Third, we have argued that industry development threatens some collaborative incentives.
We have argued that collaboration via investment vehicles and firms providing administrative services is valuable in an "infant industry" but such collaboration is at risk with industry and individual fund growth and development. "In-house" development of some skills and activities becomes increasingly feasible with size, and potential crosssubsidization across unequal sized participants of pricing decisions by a joint venture supplier or services makes governance and management arrangements of such entities an important consideration for survival. More generally, professional managers of "not for profit" organizations such as industry superannuation funds will, naturally, have personal goals which they wish to achieve -amongst which may be growth of the organization either organically or by merger, which reduce willingness and incentives to collaborate.
In Australia, legislative changes such as the introduction of "Fund Choice" of superannuation fund, together with the switch of many industry funds to "public offer"
status, has introduced competition between funds at the potential expense of further collaboration.
Fourth, and finally, the Australian experience indicates the potential for collaboration by pension funds in sustainably providing other, non-pension, financial services to members.
While the sole purpose test for pension funds prevents direct provision of other financial services to members, the relationship developed between members and their fund creates opportunities for efficient provision of such services. Joint ventures between pension funds as equity partners in banking, or other financial services, firms can draw on operational and informational economies arising from the customer relationship.
Provided that the joint venture operates with a goal of achieving an appropriate riskadjusted return on equity, that there are no investments by the pension funds in the joint venture's financial products at below market rates, and the pension fund assets are not put at risk (beyond the equity stake involved), there is nothing inherently inconsistent with the sole-purpose test. Moreover, through Board representation, organizational culture and non-financial goals consistent with the ultimate non-profit objectives of its pension fund owners can be determined. Non-listed company status can also allow management to focus more on longer-term performance than short term stock price performance, although the absence of such stock market discipline increases the importance of good internal corporate governance arrangements.
The continuing world-wide, government supported, development of the pension fund sector has implications for savings and investment levels, patterns of financial flows, and financial market structure. It also has significant implications for the potential 17 18 ownership structure and culture of significant parts of the financial sector. The potential for collaborative ventures to achieve efficiencies among small organizations in nascent industries is an important consideration in deliberations over the preferred design of pension fund systems. Also important, from a political economy perspective, is the potential for such collaboration to influence the longer term ownership structure and "culture" of significant parts of the financial system.
